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The Frailty of Everything – Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road and Modern Disaster Discourse
ISAK WINKEL HOLM
“All of this like some ancient anointing. So be it. Evoke 
the forms. Where you’ve nothing else construct ceremonies 
out of the air and breathe upon them”. 
Cormac McCarthy, The Road 74.
According to British environmentalist George Monbiot, Cormac Mc-
Carthy’s 2006 novel The Road is the most important environmental book 
ever written. McCarthy’s fictional thought experiment, Monbiot writes, 
“exposes the one terrible fact to which our technological hubris blinds us: 
our dependence on biological production remains absolute. Civilisation is 
just a russeting on the skin of the biosphere, never immune from being 
rubbed against the sleeve of environmental change” (Monbiot 294). Mon-
biot’s claim poses a crucial question about the relationship between fiction-
al and factual disasters. The Road tells the story of a father and a son trying 
to survive in the aftermath of a huge disaster that has wiped out most of 
the planet’s biosphere. In what way is this story of an imagined environ-
mental disaster important to our management of very real environmental 
disasters in the age of climate change? Monbiot’s answer is that McCa-
rthy’s novel exposes a vital fact about man’s embeddedness in the natural 
environment; hence, the importance of the novel is to be assessed by the 
same standards as, for instance, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Al Gore’s 
An Inconvenient Truth. This would mean focusing on The Road ’s rhetorical 
ability to compel us to open our eyes to an inconvenient fact. “Six weeks 
after finishing The Road, I remain haunted by it,” Monbiot confides. There 
is no doubt that disaster fiction can function as a kind of wake-up call. 
However, this can only be a part of the answer to the question about the 
relationship between fictional and factual disasters, and in the case of The 
Road it is probably a relatively small part thereof. What fictional works 
about disasters expose, I suggest, is not just the facts of disaster, but also 
the forms through which we perceive these facts.
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As several researchers of disaster discourse have noted, our repertoire 
of cultural forms relating to disaster is surprisingly small and unexpectedly 
stable (Dupuy; Kermode; Rozario). A handful of default cognitive schemes 
determine the imagination of disasters in Western culture, the most fre-
quent ones being disaster as trauma, as judgment, as calculable risk and as 
legal collapse. The quotation from Monbiot’s essay above draws on another 
frequent pattern for imagining disaster when he writes that civilisation is 
just “a russeting on the skin of the biosphere, never immune from being 
rubbed against the sleeve of environmental change.” In the vocabulary of 
modern disaster research, what is at stake here is the vulnerability of a hu-
man society. But Monbiot does not use the technical term; instead, the 
russeting skin and the sleeve form a metaphor that stands out as a poetic 
alien in his otherwise rather prosaic and polemic essay. 
On the following pages I will examine the literary imagination of vul-
nerability, not in Monbiot’s essay but in McCarthy’s novel. The disaster 
itself is only mentioned cursorily in the narrative: “The clocks stopped at 
1:17. A long shear of light and then a series of low concussions” (McCar-
thy, Road 56). In its place, the novel offers a meticulous description of a 
vulnerable human society – made up just by a single father and a single 
son – trying to survive in the ashen wasteland of Eastern America, where 
human beings have nothing to eat but the sparse remains of canned food 
and each other. The unspecified disaster exposes the frailty of the human 
world:
In those fi rst years the roads were peopled with refugees shrouded up in their 
clothing. Wearing masks and goggles, sitting in their rags by the side of the 
road like ruined aviators. Their barrows heaped with shoddy. Towing wagons or 
carts. Their eyes bright in their skulls. Creedless shells of men tottering down 
the causeways like migrants in a feverland. The frailty of everything revealed at 
last. (28)
Like the Greek word apokaluptein, the word “reveal” originally meant to 
draw aside a veil or a curtain. In this case, though, the revelation does 
not expose a robust divine order but the utter frailty of the social order. 
Frail and fragile are recurring adjectives in the description of the son, their 
makeshift tarp tent and the world of ideas that the father and the son share. 
From the perspective of the novel, the disaster does not produce human 
vulnerability, it rather reveals an inherent vulnerability that was there all 
the time.
The World Trade Center, the war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Katrina – The 
Road was written in an epoch where American society was all of a sud-
den forced to imagine itself as vulnerable, not just to ‘evil’ forces coming 
from the outside, but also to internal breakdowns of its own civilisation. 
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The novel thus gives literary form to a contemporary experience of the 
“frailty of everything”. In fact, it is a common feature of all McCarthy’s 
novels that they explore a liminal landscape on the fringe of civilisation in 
which vulnerable human bodies and vulnerable human societies are ex-
posed to violence and chance. What interests me here are not the facts but 
the forms of human vulnerability. I will not delve further into the political 
history – from the Vietnam War onwards – that produced this particular 
experience of vulnerability. Instead, I will examine the cultural history that 
supplied the discursive forms of vulnerability. These historical patterns of 
imagination function as conditions of possibility when we understand and 
express an experience of vulnerability. One branch of Western disaster fic-
tion focuses not on disaster itself but rather on the way human society is 
able or unable to cope with disaster. To name but a few examples, this 
genre of disaster fiction spans from Heinrich von Kleist’s short story “The 
Earthquake in Chile”, Richard Wagner’s Twilight of the Gods and José Sara-
mago’s Blindness up to and including the recent wake of post-apocalyptic 
movies – and, I would like to add – Cormac McCarthy’s The Road.
Vulnerability
Disaster research emerged as a branch of sociology during the Cold War, 
which was probably why the definition of disaster was shaped after the 
mushroom cloud. An important definition from 1961 describes a dis-
aster as an event impacting an entire society and preventing “essential 
functions of society” (Perry and Quarantelli). Classical disaster research 
imagined disaster as an event striking a peaceful society from the out-
side, just like a bomb dispatched by a foreign superpower. During the 
last twenty to thirty years, however, disaster research has shifted its fo-
cus from the impact on human society of an external event towards the 
contribution of human society to disaster, or at least to the severity and 
duration of disaster. As in McCarthy’s novel, the important thing is not 
the apocalyptic event itself; rather, it is the “pre-disaster conditions” de-
termining the way human society is able or unable to cope with disaster 
(Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 4). The antonyms “vulnerability” and “resil-
ience” have become the catchphrases for this paradigm shift. To quote an 
influential definition, vulnerability is “the characteristics of a person or 
group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope 
with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner 
11), whereas resilience, in the words of The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, can be defined as “the ability of a social or ecological 
system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure 
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and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capac-
ity to adapt to stress and change” (IPCC 880).
Sociologists tend to see vulnerability as an objective fact that one can 
send out a team of researchers to measure in the field. However, this so-
ciological notion of vulnerability is a “pot-pourri of terms” covering a frus-
tratingly heterogeneous collection of ecological, technological, economic 
and social phenomena (Kasperson and Kasperson 252). Recently, the phi-
losopher Judith Butler has reminded us that vulnerability should be seen 
not as an objective fact “out there” but rather as a discursive fact. The way 
we figure our own vulnerability – and, importantly, the way we react to 
it politically – is shaped by “the normative schemes of intelligibility” that 
determine what we mean by being human and by society (Butler 146).1
Even if the technical term of vulnerability is relatively recent, the dis-
cursive schemes of vulnerability go back a couple of hundred years. To be 
more precise, the idea was invented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau after the 
first modern natural disaster, the famous Lisbon earthquake in 1755. The 
cultural shockwaves of the earthquake were interpreted through the con-
cept of theodicy, an artificial word at the time newly coined by the Ger-
man philosopher Gottfried Leibniz by combining theos and dike, the Greek 
words for ‘God’ and ‘justice’. Si Deus est, unde malum? If God is almighty 
and good, how come the world is full of evil and meaningless events such 
as earthquakes?
One side of the theodicy debate was taken by the Church, according 
to which the earthquake was a just punishment for the sinful citizens of 
Lisbon. On the same side of the debate, one also found enlightened theist 
philosophers who, like Leibniz, argued that there was a rational providen-
tial order hiding behind apparently disorderly events like earthquakes, and 
thus that the world was the best of all possible worlds. On the other side 
of the debate was Voltaire, who wrote his famous poem on Lisbon only a 
couple of weeks after the quake, and who made fun of the optimistic Leib-
niz and Alexander Pope in his satirical novel Candide, published in 1759. 
As Voltaire wrote in a letter, the Lisbon poem was “a kick in the rear of 
Providence” (Gouhier 76). According to Voltaire, there was no meaning-
ful order to be found behind the tragic events in Lisbon, neither as diverse 
1 Butler’s focus is the “corporeal vulnerability” of the individual subject, whereas the fo-
cus of modern disaster research is the systemic vulnerability of a whole society or social 
group. However, her insight into the discursive formation of vulnerability is still relevant: 
“If vulnerability is one precondition for humanization, and humanization takes place 
differently through variable norms of recognition, then it follows that vulnerability is 
fundamentally dependent on existing norms of recognition if it is to be attributed to any 
human subject” (Butler 146).
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punishment nor as diverse rationality; there were just the crazy contingen-
cies of the natural disaster.
Provoked by Voltaire’s poem, Rousseau wrote a letter to Voltaire in 
which he struggled to find a middle position between the two sides of the 
theodicy debate. On the one hand, he wanted to defend the concept of 
providence against Voltaire’s attack, while on the other he did not want to 
save providence simply by blaming the citizens of Lisbon, like the tradi-
tional Christians did. In his effort to solve this problem, Rousseau stum-
bled upon the concept of vulnerability:
[...] the majority of our physical misfortunes are also our work. Without leaving 
your Lisbon subject, concede, for example, that it was hardly nature that there 
brought together twenty-thousand houses of six or seven stories. If the residents 
of this large city had been more evenly dispersed and less densely housed, the 
losses would have been fewer or perhaps none at all. Everyone would have fl ed at 
the fi rst shock. (Rousseau IV, 1061)
Rousseau defends providence by claiming that the sufferings of the citi-
zens of Lisbon are not accidental; there is, indeed, an order behind the 
apparent chaos – but this order is sociological rather than theological. 
The residents of Lisbon have themselves contributed to the disaster, not 
by being vile sinners but simply by building tall houses too close to each 
other. As Susan Neiman writes in her brilliant history of the theodicy 
debate, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy from 
2002, Rousseau defends God so well that God Himself is made superflu-
ous (Neiman 55). 
With this radical change of perspective, Rousseau turns the whole the-
odicy debate around. Before Rousseau, there was only a vertical theodicy, 
arguing the pros and cons of a metaphysical order behind the contingen-
cies of the finite world. Rousseau made it possible to imagine a horizontal 
theodicy posing the question about a human order – according to Rous-
seau a social and political order – behind the sufferings of human beings. 
This secularised theodicy was soon to play a major role in the German 
philosophy of history, as well as in modern disaster discourse. In Rousseau’s 
letter on providence, we attend the birth of vulnerability out of the spirit 
of theodicy (Dynes).
Theodicy without Theos
In a paragraph of intense nostalgic beauty from The Road, the father re-
members what the world was like before the biosphere collapsed and before 
his wife committed suicide in post-apocalyptic despair:
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He remembered waking once on such a night to the clatter of crabs in the pan 
where he’d left steak bones from the night before. Faint deep coals of the drift-
wood fi re pulsing in the onshore wind. Lying under such a myriad of stars. The 
sea’s black horizon. He rose and walked out and stood barefoot in the sand and 
watched the pale surf appear all down the shore and roll and crash and darken 
again. When he went back to the fi re he knelt and smoothed her hair as she 
slept and he said if he were God he would have made the world just so and no 
different. (219)
The father’s utterance at the end of the paragraph is an answer to the the-
odicy problem. The historical model for this judgment about the justice of 
the world is the Spanish King Alfonso X (1221–1284), one of the recurring 
figures of the theodicy debate. In his day, the king of Castille was known as 
“el Sabio” (the Wise) due to his impressive contributions to astronomy, po-
etry, law and chess theory; however, it was not his merits as an intellectual 
that made him famous but one single remark that legend has him saying: 
“If I had been of God’s counsel at the creation, many things would have 
been ordered better.” This remark was enough to make him notoriously 
famous as a blasphemer for the following five hundred years. Medieval 
commentators list the real and imagined troubles of Alfonso’s life in order 
to prove that God is keen on punishing this kind of arrogance: the king’s 
son rebelled against him, he died in a civil war and on one occasion he even 
became a disaster victim when a terrible thunderstorm ignited the king’s 
and the queen’s garments – only to diminish when he kneeled down and 
retracted his blasphemy.
Pierre Bayle introduced King Alfonso into the theodicy debate in his 
Historical and Critical Dictionary, published in 1695–97. In the article on 
“Manicheans”, he argued that, considering the undeniable evils of this 
world, God was either not good or not almighty (the Manicheans opted for 
the latter). In the Dictionary’s article on King Alfonso, Bayle defended the 
king for making his critical remark about the goodness of the world. May-
be the hard-working astronomer just wanted to express his understandable 
frustration over the gap between his Ptolemaic system and his astronomical 
observations, Bayle suggested. Leibniz’ essay on Theodicy – to a large de-
gree a reply to Bayle’s article on the Manicheans – defends the ways of God 
by ridiculing King Alfonso. “You have known the world only since the day 
before yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carp at the 
world” (Leibniz 248). According to Leibniz, it was only a matter of time 
and research funding to establish the basic rational order of the world.
The father in McCarthy’s novel would have made the world “just so 
and no different”, whereas King Alfonso would have created a world that 
was “ordered better.” Still, they both imagine themselves present at the 
creation and use this divine perspective to pass judgment about the good-
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ness of the world. To be sure, King Alfonso is not the only theodicy motif 
in The Road. Among the classical topoi of the cultural history of theodicy, 
one finds the deep misery caused by a sick child (250), the wish to never 
have been born (169) and the rage against God (11, 96, 114). Like Job – in 
the most important biblical text about the theodicy problem – the father is 
sitting “among the ashes” in the cauterised post-apocalyptic world. 
The theodicy motif is conspicuously present in several of McCarthy’s 
novels, most explicitly so in The Crossing (1994), McCarthy’s most impor-
tant and most impressive piece of disaster fiction before The Road. A whole 
segment of The Crossing tells the story of a man who loses his child and his 
trust in the world in a Mexican earthquake and spends the last years of his 
life as a witness in a trial against God. In Blood Meridian, discussions be-
tween the murderous Judge Holden and an ex-priest about the contingen-
cies of the Mexican desert and the possible “hand of a cynical god” behind 
them sound like a modernised and radicalised theodicy debate (McCarthy, 
Blood Meridian 153). Perversely, Judge Holden plays the role of the Span-
ish king when he experiences a deep harmony with the desert around him: 
“Then he sat with his hands cupped in his lap and he seemed much satis-
fied with the world, as if his counsel had been sought at its creation” (Blood 
Meridian 140).2
In The Road, the network of erudite allusions to King Alfonso, Job 
and the justice of the world are found in a fictional universe in which 
God is blatantly absent. The father and the son are travelling through a 
one-dimensional world, an ashen immanence stripped of transcendent 
phenomena, be it sunlight, planets, stars or even birds in the air or trout in 
the brooks. The universe of the novel is a “crushing black vacuum” (130), 
the landscape a “barren, silent, godless” (4) and “coldly secular” (274), the 
darkness “without depth or dimension” (67), the planets “blind dogs of the 
sun” (130), the winds “bleak and temporal” (11), and so on. In this uni-
verse of brute contingencies, there are no traces left of God’s providence, 
or in McCarthy’s great phrase: “No lists of things to be done. The day 
providential to itself” (54). The immanent ashen desert of The Road equals 
the immanence of the Mexican desert in Blood Meridian, as described in a 
classical essay by Steven Shaviro: “There is no transcendence, and no possi-
bility of standing out from Being. There is no stance by which subjectivity 
might fold back upon itself, thereby affirming and preserving itself, or at 
2 Earlier in The Crossing, Billy, the young protagonist, has a vision of the wolves as beastly 
King Alfonsos moving around in a world that is “as perfect to their use as if their counsel 
had been sought in the devising of it” (McCarthy, Border 338). Some pages later, this way 
of thinking is called “the sin of orgullo” (McCarthy, Border 355).
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least attenuating the shock of those multiple, fatal encounters that mark its 
inherence in the world” (Shaviro 16). 
One can wonder what the old question about God’s justice is doing in 
a fictional universe where God is irrevocably dead. As I see it, The Road ’s 
theodicy motifs are not some kind of phantom pain in a missing theologi-
cal limb; rather, I propose that we read the novel as an heir to Rousseau’s 
horizontalisation of the theodicy debate. The Road does not pose the ver-
tical question about a divine order behind the world but the horizontal 
question about a secular order in the world. As the German historian of 
philosophy Hans Blumenberg has taught, the secularisation of theological 
motifs is a matter of form rather than content (Blumenberg). The Rous-
seauian secularisation of the theodicy debate clears out the classical the-
odicy themes from their original theological content and transforms them 
into empty cultural forms. Subsequently, these cognitive schemes can be 
used for shaping and organising the experience of vulnerability. Tousling 
the son’s hair before the fire to dry it, the father makes a reflection that 
is presumably not only about drying hair, but also about writing novels: 
“All of this like some ancient anointing. So be it. Evoke the forms. Where 
you’ve nothing else construct ceremonies out of the air and breathe upon 
them” (74).
Admittedly, God is evoked in person in the pre-apocalyptic beach 
scene quoted above, and the father also kneels down as if in prayer. But 
he kneels down to his wife, and the deep, beautiful order described in the 
paragraph is a worldly order. The paragraph is not praise to a divine order 
but, rather, a hymn to a cosmic order. The whole passage is about the 
complicated interrelations and interactions between things and names in 
a landscape: the onshore wind making the driftwood fire pulse, the steak 
bones attracting the crabs, the pale surf reaching the shore, the wife made 
visible by the light of the fire and the stars.
A world that should be made “just so and no different” is a world that 
is okay. The word “okay” is repeated close to two hundred times in the 
dialogues between the father and the son, which make up the bulk of the 
novel: “‘Come on’, the man said. ‘Everything’s okay. I promise’” (135). Say-
ing that something is okay is more than saying that something is. When a 
specific action or event is judged as being okay, it is not just there, but also 
in accordance with a meaningful order in the world. In this sense, the word 
“okay” is a minimal theodicy. When Candide, in Voltaire’s satirical novel, 
experiences the Lisbon earthquake on his own body and is lying covered in 
rubbish from the demolished houses, his friend Dr. Pangloss is ready with 
an optimistic explanation: “‘This concussion of the earth is no new thing,’ 
said Pangloss, ‘the city of Lima in South America, experienced the same 
last year; the same cause, the same effects.’” Like a radicalised and agonised 
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Dr. Pangloss, the father in The Road asserts that everything is okay, even if 
the world after the disaster could hardly be less okay.
Nevertheless, McCarthy’s novel is not, like Voltaire’s, a satire about 
stupid people making theodicies. The father claims that everything is 
okay, not because he has read bad philosophical books but out of sheer 
existential necessity. “Don’t lose heart,” the father repeatedly says to him-
self (177), and one way of not losing heart is assuring each other that 
everything is okay. Without the minimal theodicy of the word “okay”, 
it is impossible to continue the sad and scary journey through the ashen 
desert: “‘Come on,’ the man said. ‘Everything’s okay.’” The alternative is 
exemplified by the mother of the son who, before the beginning of the 
novel, one day exclaims “I don’t care. It’s meaningless,” and walks off to 
commit suicide (56).
The pre-apocalyptic scene by the beach is contrasted by several scenes 
where the father watches the son sleeping under the tarp in the “cold au-
tistic dark” (15):
He lay listening to the water drip in the woods. Bedrock this. The cold and the 
silence. The ashes of the late world carried on the bleak and temporal winds 
to and fro in the void. Carried forth and scattered forth again. Everything un-
coupled from its shoring. Unsupported in the ashen air. Sustained by a breath, 
trembling and brief. If only my heart were stone. (11)
To support and to sustain are two roughly synonymous words, but in this 
passage everything is simultaneously unsupported and sustained. The ap-
parent contradiction can be explained, I suggest, by distinguishing between 
two different kinds of support, namely external and internal. Everything is 
unsupported because there is no external order in the world on which the 
father and the son can lean. Contrasting the beach scene, there is no longer 
a cosmological web of interrelations between the things of the landscape, 
as there is only “uncoupled” matter drifting around in the void. This is 
Voltaire’s cold vision of disaster in its most radical incarnation.
But even if everything is unsupported by an external order, it is still 
sustained by the breath of man. In order to continue their journey through 
the desert, it is an existential necessity for the father and the son to assert 
that everything is okay. To himself, the father calls the son “his warrant” 
(5), and, inversely, he knows that his job is to take care of the son by 
warranting the meaning of the world (77). In the absence of any external 
warrant for the meaning of the world, minimal theodicy has shrunk to a 
single performative sentence, a human breath making a linguistic promise: 
“‘Everything’s okay. I promise.’”
In the vocabulary of Continental philosophy, the father’s predicament 
is similar to the problem that the late Friedrich Nietzsche diagnosed in his 
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texts on the eternal recurrence, which is in fact another idea that originates 
in the classical theodicy debate (Neiman 206ff). If everything keeps going 
around in the same loop, there can be no external narrative order support-
ing the meaning of life. Hence, man alone is responsible for justifying the 
world by saying Nietzsche’s famous “Ja!” – which is, of course, the German 
word for “okay”.
In the vocabulary of modern disaster research, a “trembling and brief” 
heart that is not made of stone is a vulnerable heart. Unlike theology, Mc-
Carthy’s secularised theodicy does not question a divine infrastructure be-
hind the world; unlike sociology, it does not explore the vulnerability of a 
social infrastructure within the human world. What is at stake in the novel 
is the basic vulnerability of what could be called an existential infrastruc-
ture, making it possible for a human being to feel at home in the world. 
The father’s heart is trembling and the son’s breath is “frail” (14); nonethe-
less, they are burdened with the heavy task of justifying the world. After 
the death of God, Susan Neiman writes, theodicy survives as a question 
about “the most basic trust in the world, the grounds that make civilisation 
possible” (Neiman 1).
Cosmodicy and Anthropodicy
My existential perspective on the theodicy debate is in line with several 
McCarthy studies. In a recent reading of The Road, John Cant asks how 
the father and the son are able to confront the wasteland. “McCarthy’s 
favoured answer, expressed in each of his texts to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, is that of the inherent vitality of the ardenthearted, for whom the 
significance of life is asserted existentially and in defiance of mere reason 
alone” (Cant 187). In other words, Cant finds the answer in a notion 
of existential resilience. However, vitality and ardentheartedness alone 
do not solve the theodicy problem. Fundamentally, theodicy is a trial 
in which human reason accuses or defends the goodness of the creator, 
and in a trial one needs proof and rational arguments. Even a heart, be 
it ardent or frail, is in need of good reasons for acknowledging that the 
world is okay. The father cannot urge the son to continue down the road 
just by saying, “Don’t lose heart” and “Come on”; he has to figure out 
some reasonable argument in order to convince the son that the world is, 
in fact, worth trusting. 
The argument for the goodness of the world runs along two lines in the 
novel, the first concerning man’s relation to the landscape and the second 
concerning man’s relation to other human beings. In McCarthy’s work, 
secularised theodicy comes in two versions which could be named, respec-
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tively, cosmodicy and anthropodicy.3 Whereas cosmodicy is a question about 
the goodness of the world, anthropodicy is a question about the goodness 
of man.
We have already seen the question of cosmodicy answered in the af-
firmative in the pre-apocalyptic scene from the beach. Here, the feeling 
that the world should be made “just so and no different” is based on an 
experience of a coastal landscape: the wind, the driftwood fire, the steak 
bones, the crabs, the surf, the stars and the woman echo each other in a 
complicated network of things and names. Apparently, everything is okay 
when the father experiences himself as a part of the landscape’s dense web 
of relations. This is probably why the technology of orientation plays a ma-
jor role in the novel: a brass sextant, a flare pistol, a telephone directory, a 
list of things to be done and, first of all, a map that is in fact just “the pieces 
of the map” on which the names of the cities no longer match the reality 
of the carbonised world.
Another pre-apocalyptic recollection, in many ways similar to the 
beach scene, connects the feeling of a spatial order directly to the idea of 
justification. Here, the question of cosmodicy is answered by a feeling that 
everything is in its right place, and this feeling is mediated by a map:
He’d pored over maps as a child, keeping one fi nger on the town where he lived. 
Just as he would look up his family in the phone directory. Themselves among 
others, everything in its place. Justifi ed in the world. ‘Come on,’ he said. ‘We 
should go.’ (182)
It is this feeling of cosmodicy – that everything is in its place – that the 
nameless disaster has shattered. In The Crossing, a blind man explains how 
his sudden blinding has influenced his relationship to his native Mexican 
landscape: “The bonds that fixed him in the world had become rigid” 
(McCarthy, Border 591). A couple of pages later the blind man sums up: 
“Ese mundo es un mundo frágil” (Border 603).
Anthropodicy, on the other hand, is not about the relation between 
man and place but between man and man. In the novel, the exploration 
of anthropodicy is structured by the distinction between “good guys” and 
“bad guys”, a kind of rhetorical trick the father uses to motivate the son to 
go on, for instance when he is in need of an argument to find out what is 
hiding behind a locked door:
3 The word cosmodicy (“Kosmodicee”) was coined by Friedrich Nietzsche in a letter to 
Erwin Rohde February 1872 (Nietzsche 294). The word anthropodicy took shape in Eu-
ropean philosophy during the twentieth Century.
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[...] I know you’re scared. That’s okay. I think there may be things in there and 
we have to take a look. There’s no place else to go. This is it. I want you to help 
me. If you don’t want to hold the lamp you’ll have to take the pistol.
I’ll hold the lamp.
Okay. This is what the good guys do. They keep trying. They don’t give up.
Okay. (137)
In the post-apocalyptic world, human society has collapsed into a violent 
state of nature peopled with groups of bearded and tattooed cannibals with 
“reptilian calculations” in their “cold and shifty eyes” (75). In this bar-
barous world, the father has made up the fiction that he and the son are 
“carrying the fire” of humanity and goodness (83). It soon becomes clear, 
however, that the distinction between “good guys” and “bad guys” is not 
stable. On the one hand, the son – mysteriously – adheres to the moral 
ideals of the world before the disaster. On the other hand, the father has 
to be cynical and egoistical in order to survive in the war of all against all. 
Each time the father and the son meet someone on the road – a dog, a little 
boy, an old man, a thief, etc. – the event triggers a rudimentary political 
negotiation about how to behave: whether they should help or whether 
they should just make reptilian calculations about surviving themselves, 
i.e. whether goodness is really relevant for the way human beings act or 
whether it is just an out-dated word. Anthropodicy takes the form of an 
ongoing negotiation of the scope and quality of the moral infrastructure 
of human life.
To sum up, the cultural forms of the theodicy debate give shape to two 
different versions of human vulnerability in The Road. Cosmodicy poses 
the question about the vulnerability of the bonds that fix man in a land-
scape, whereas anthropodicy questions the vulnerability of the social bonds 
that bind human beings together in a moral order.
Mystery
The last paragraph of the novel is another nostalgically beautiful pre-apoc-
alyptic scene, but also an astonishing literary image of vulnerability:
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could see 
them standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fi ns wimpled 
softly in the fl ow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished and muscular and 
torsional. On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the world 
in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. Not 
be made right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were older than 
man and they hummed of mystery. (286)
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Throughout the novel, the trout in the deep glens have been developed as 
an image of the obscure depth of the cosmos, as opposed to the flat post-
apocalyptic earth without shadow or depth. The father and the son pass a 
pool where “once he’d watched trout swaying in the current, tracking their 
perfect shadows on the stones beneath” (30). A little further down the 
road, they cross another river: “He’d stood at such a river once and watched 
the flash of trout deep in a pool, invisible to see in the tea-colored water 
except as they turned on their sides to feed. Reflecting back the sun deep 
in the darkness like a flash of knives in a cave” (43).
It goes without saying that these trout are ripe with allusions. In Plato, 
shadows and caves are used to illustrate the relation between the world 
of ideas and the world of phenomena (Hunt and Jacobsen). In Christian 
theology, the fish is an image of the saviour. And in American literature, 
from Thoreau to Hemingway, the act of fishing is a commonplace practice 
that connotes redemption and spiritual recovery (Schaub). Still, I will ar-
gue that the trout do not illustrate philosophical or religious ideas. In this 
final paragraph, the trout and their halo of connotations (meaning, depth 
and redemption) function as cultural forms that shape the basic theme of 
the novel. In other words, the moss-smelling trout in the hand is a literary 
image of vulnerability. As every trout fisher knows, the sensitive skin of the 
trout cannot stand more than a brief moment outside water. In fact, this 
image of vulnerability is very similar to Monbiot’s metaphor with the rus-
seting skin of the biosphere.
The word “mystery” carries considerable weight as the final word of the 
novel and as the only occurrence of this word in the novel. “Mystery” is, 
of course, another Christian theme, designating God’s plan that has been 
kept secret for many an age but is now partly disclosed (Rom. 16: 25–6). 
However, I will argue that McCarthy uses this Christian idea in the secu-
larised context of vulnerability. In the perspective of cosmodicy, the hum-
ming mystery of the trout is the intricate web of relationships between the 
things and names that make up a landscape: the fish smelling of moss, the 
water looking like amber, the patterns on their backs looking like tracks of 
worms (“vermiculate”) and so on. An image of this network of echoes is 
visible on the backs of the trout as maps and mazes. In the perspective of 
anthropodicy, on the other hand, the mystery is the inherent but inexplica-
ble goodness of the son that even the persons he insists on helping do not 
understand (“‘Why did he do it?’” 173). The residual goodness of the son is 
the last sign that there is still, perhaps, a hidden moral order in human life.
A vulnerable world is a world where this double mystery has become 
impotent. The novel uses the cultural forms of the theodicy debate to pose 
a question about the status of this mysterious hidden order. In Blood Me-
ridian, Judge Holden, the satanic killer of the Mexican desert, denies the 
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dream of a hidden meaning: “Your heart’s desire is to be told some mystery. 
The mystery is that there is no mystery” (Blood Meridian 252). In an im-
portant essay from 1992, Leo Daugherty suggests reading Blood Meridian 
as a “Gnostic Tragedy”. When the novel describes the band of the scalp 
hunters’ “mindless violence” in the Mexican desert, we are in fact dealing 
with traces of Manichean Gnosticism, an early version of Christianity ac-
cording to which the world was created by an evil demiurge. In this per-
spective, Judge Holden is a demiurge who denies any mysterious godly or-
der in the material world. I find Daugherty’s reading convincing, especially 
if it is stressed that these Manichean ideas are part of the wider theodicy 
debate, a perspective he only alludes to: “So, whereas most thoughtful peo-
ple have looked at the world they lived in and asked, How did evil get into 
it?, the Gnostics looked at the world and asked, How did good get into it?” 
(Daugherty 162). 
Nevertheless, the main claim of Daugherty’s essay – that “Gnostic 
thought is central to Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian” – needs qualifi-
cation. In my view, Gnostic thought is central to McCarthy, not as content 
but as form, and this cultural form is filled up with the stuff of human 
vulnerability. In Blood Meridian as well, human vulnerability is twofold, 
seen from the perspective of either cosmodicy or anthropodicy. On the 
one hand, it is a question about the relation between the group of scalp 
hunters and the landscape they exploit, while on the other it is a question 
about the relation between the scalp hunters themselves as a fragile society 
“beyond men’s judgements,” where “all covenants were brittle” (Blood Me-
ridian 106).
As I have tried to show in this essay, The Road is not referring to the 
religious substance of the theodicy debate but is rather recycling the tra-
ditional theodicy themes as empty cultural forms. This does not mean, of 
course, that the theodicy motifs should be discarded as religious décor in 
an overtly erudite novel. On the contrary, this particular subset of cultural 
forms plays a central role as a condition of possibility for the novel’s imagi-
nation of human vulnerability. Without the long history of the theodicy 
debate, human vulnerability could not have been made visible like this. 
Neither does it mean that the theodicy ideas are the only cultural forms 
at work in the novel, as a comprehensive cultural archaeology of the novel 
would have to take into consideration, among other things, the genre con-
ventions of science fiction as well as the classical American imagination of 
the wilderness. The surprising thing is, however, that the European history 
of theodicy plays a crucial role in McCarthy’s otherwise very American 
imagination of disaster vulnerability.
Modern disaster discourse is an ensemble of cultural forms – cognitive 
schemata, scientific concepts, narrative plots, metaphorical images, rhetori-
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cal questions, etc. – framing the way we see disasters and the way we re-
main blind to them. Since the Lisbon earthquake, Western disaster fiction 
has revealed and reworked the cultural frame through which we perceive 
disaster. Thus, disaster fiction not only depicts the brute facts of disas-
ters, fictional or factual, but also the cultural forms through which these 
facts become visible to us. The Road is indeed an important environmental 
book – not because it expresses one terrible fact about disaster but because 
it exposes the deep grammar of our collective imagination of disaster.
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